Grade: F — Major Red Flags
Framework: Schilit *Financial Shenanigans* + Beneish M-Score + forensic accounting principles
Data: SEC EDGAR 10-K (Filed February 24, 2026, FY ended December 31, 2025) + Yahoo Finance
Auditor: PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP — Unqualified opinion
One-line verdict: Roper Technologies triggers three red flags: goodwill plus intangibles at a staggering 156% of equity ($31.1B on $19.9B equity), cash covering only 3% of $9.3B in debt, and negative free cash flow after acquisitions for three consecutive years. The M-Score of -2.53 is clean, CFFO/NI of 1.65 is excellent, and the underlying software businesses generate strong recurring revenue. But Roper is a serial acquirer that spent $3.3B on acquisitions in 2025, $3.6B in 2024, and $2.1B in 2023 — a total of $9.0B in three years — funded by debt. The balance sheet is a tower of purchased goodwill. If any of these acquired businesses underperform, the impairment risk is substantial. This is a high-quality business running a high-risk capital allocation strategy.
| Metric | Result |
|---|---|
| Red Flags | **3** (Goodwill 156% of equity, cash 3% of debt, negative post-acquisition FCF 3 years) |
| Watch Items | **0** |
| Checks Completed | **17/18** (1 N/A: impairment data) |
| Beneish M-Score | **-2.53** (clean; threshold is -2.22) |
| Auditor | PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP — Unqualified opinion |
The Serial Acquirer Model: Software via M&A
Roper Technologies is a diversified technology company operating through three segments. The 10-K breaks out the revenue by segment and type:
| Segment | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | YoY Growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Application Software | $4,483.0M | $3,868.3M | $3,186.9M | +16% |
| Network Software | $1,600.8M | $1,475.6M | $1,439.4M | +8% |
| Technology Enabled Products | $1,818.7M | $1,695.3M | $1,551.5M | +7% |
| **Total** | **$7,902.5M** | **$7,039.2M** | **$6,177.8M** | **+12.3%** |
Revenue quality by type is impressive:
| Revenue Type | FY2025 | % of Total |
|---|---|---|
| Software Recurring (SaaS, PCS, annual licenses) | $4,482.9M | 57% |
| Software Reoccurring (transactional/volume) | $833.1M | 11% |
| Software Non-recurring (perpetual, implementation) | $813.9M | 10% |
| Product Revenue | $1,772.6M | 22% |
| **Total** | **$7,902.5M** | **100%** |
Recurring software revenue of $4.5B grew from $4.0B (+13%), constituting 57% of total revenue. When combined with reoccurring transactional revenue ($833M), nearly 70% of Roper's revenue is recurring or highly predictable. This is the business model's core strength — it generates consistent cash flows that service the debt used to make more acquisitions.
Profitability: Headline Numbers
| Metric | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | Trend |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $6,177.8M | $7,039.2M | $7,902.5M | +28% over 2 years |
| Net Income | $1,384.2M | $1,549.3M | $1,536.3M | Flat YoY |
| Gross Margin | 69.7% | 69.3% | 69.2% | Stable at ~69% |
| Net Margin | 22.4% | 22.0% | 19.4% | Declining |
| Effective Tax Rate | ~21% | ~21% | ~21% | Stable |
Revenue grew 12.3% but net income was essentially flat ($1,536M vs. $1,549M). The filing explains this through the line items: amortization of intangible assets surged to $858.4M (from $775.7M) as newly acquired businesses' intangibles are amortized. Interest expense increased as debt rose from $7.7B to $9.3B to fund acquisitions.
The 69.2% gross margin is very high, reflecting the software-heavy revenue mix. But the gap between gross margin and net margin (69% to 19%) reveals the burden of acquisition-driven costs: $858M in intangible amortization and significant interest expense.
Per the filing, the effective tax rate was 20.6% in 2025, expected to be 21-22% in 2026.
Cash Flow: Strong Operations, Voracious Acquisitions
| Metric | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $2,035M | $2,393M | $2,540M |
| Net Income | $1,384M | $1,549M | $1,536M |
| **CFFO / Net Income** | **1.47** | **1.54** | **1.65** |
| CapEx + Capitalized Software | $108M | $111M | $105M |
| Free Cash Flow | $1,927M | $2,282M | $2,436M |
| Acquisitions | ($2,053M) | ($3,613M) | ($3,290M) |
| **FCF After Acquisitions** | **($126M)** | **($1,331M)** | **($854M)** |
This is the key table. CFFO/NI of 1.65 is excellent and *improving* year-over-year. Free cash flow of $2.4B is robust. The underlying businesses are genuine cash generators — CapEx of only $105M against $7.9B revenue means Roper's software businesses require minimal reinvestment.
But acquisitions consumed $3.3B in 2025, $3.6B in 2024, and $2.1B in 2023 — a cumulative $9.0B. Free cash flow after acquisitions was negative in all three years. This is funded by issuing debt: the filing shows $2.0B in new senior notes issued in 2025, $2.0B in 2024, and revolving credit facility borrowings of $725M.
The machine works as follows: Roper generates strong free cash flow from existing software businesses, then uses that cash flow (plus additional debt) to acquire more software businesses, which generate more cash flow, enabling more acquisitions. As long as acquired businesses perform as expected and debt markets remain open, the flywheel spins. If either condition breaks, the result is a balance sheet crisis.
The 18-Point Screening
Revenue Quality
| # | Check | Result | Detail |
|---|---|---|---|
| A1 | DSO Change | ✅ | DSO 46 days, flat YoY |
| A2 | AR vs Revenue Growth | ✅ | AR +13.1% vs revenue +12.3% |
| A3 | Revenue vs CFFO | ✅ | Revenue +12.3%, CFFO +6.1% |
Revenue quality is clean. DSO is stable at 46 days. AR growth of 13.1% is roughly in line with 12.3% revenue growth — no divergence signal. CFFO grew more slowly than revenue (6.1% vs. 12.3%), but this is within normal range and partially reflects timing of working capital items.
Expense Quality
| # | Check | Result | Detail |
|---|---|---|---|
| B1 | Inventory vs COGS | ✅ | Inventory +17.3% vs COGS +12.5% |
| B2 | CapEx vs Revenue | ✅ | CapEx -5.7% vs revenue +12.3% |
| B3 | SG&A Ratio | ✅ | SG&A/Gross Profit = 59.1% |
| B4 | Gross Margin | ✅ | 69.2%, -0.1pp, stable |
All expense checks pass. The very low CapEx relative to revenue ($105M on $7.9B) reflects the capital-light nature of software businesses. The SG&A ratio of 59.1% appears high but includes $858M in intangible amortization from acquisitions — a non-cash charge that inflates operating expenses relative to software peers.
Cash Flow Quality
| # | Check | Result | Detail |
|---|---|---|---|
| C1 | CFFO vs Net Income | ✅ | CFFO/NI = 1.65. Excellent |
| C2 | Free Cash Flow | ✅ | FCF $2.4B, FCF/NI = 1.59 |
| C3 | Accruals Ratio | ✅ | -2.9%. Low accruals — healthy |
| C4 | Cash vs Debt | ❌ | Cash $297M covers only 3% of debt $9.3B |
C4 — Critical cash shortfall. Cash of $297M against $9.3B total debt is a 3.2% coverage ratio. The filing shows $8.5B in fixed-rate borrowings (1.40% to 5.10%) plus $850M in revolving credit facility borrowings. Roper runs with minimal cash on hand, relying on its $3.5B revolving credit facility (of which $850M was drawn and $2.65B available) for liquidity.
Debt/EBITDA of 3.0x and interest coverage of 6.9x are adequate but not conservative for a company in acquisition mode. The filing notes that the credit facility "restricts our ability to, among other things, create certain liens, enter into sale/leaseback transactions."
Balance Sheet
| # | Check | Result | Detail |
|---|---|---|---|
| D1 | Goodwill + Intangibles | ❌ | $31.1B = 156% of equity |
| D2 | Leverage | ✅ | Debt/EBITDA = 3.0x |
| D3 | Soft Asset Growth | ✅ | Other assets +16.6% vs revenue +12.3% |
| D4 | Asset Impairment | — | No write-off data available |
D1 — This is the most significant structural risk. Goodwill of $21.3B and intangible assets of $9.8B total $31.1B — 156% of stockholders' equity of $19.9B. This means if Roper had to write off just 64% of its goodwill and intangibles, equity would be wiped out entirely.
The goodwill breakdown by segment from the filing:
Goodwill acquired in 2025 alone was $2,024M ($1,247M Application Software, $703M Network Software, $74M TEP). In 2024, $2,255M was acquired.
Per the filing, Roper tests goodwill for impairment annually during the fourth quarter. The most significant accounting estimates involve "the areas of income taxes, valuation of other intangible assets, goodwill and other indefinite-lived intangibles impairment analyses, and valuation of our equity investment in Indicor." No impairment was recorded in FY2025, but the filing warns that "recently completed acquisitions generally represent the highest risk of impairment."
Acquisition Risk
| # | Check | Result | Detail |
|---|---|---|---|
| E1 | Serial Acquirer FCF | ❌ | FCF after acquisitions negative for 3 years |
| E2 | Goodwill Surge | ✅ | Goodwill+Intangibles +10% YoY |
E1 — Three consecutive years of negative post-acquisition FCF. This is the defining characteristic of Roper's business model. The company spent $3.3B on acquisitions in 2025 against $2.4B in FCF. In 2024: $3.6B vs. $2.3B. In 2023: $2.1B vs. $1.9B. Every year, Roper spends more on acquisitions than it generates in free cash flow, funding the gap with debt.
This strategy works in a low-rate, risk-on environment. In a high-rate, risk-off environment, the cost of debt rises, acquisition multiples may not compress proportionally, and the marginal deal becomes value-destructive.
Manipulation Score
| # | Check | Result | Detail |
|---|---|---|---|
| F1 | Beneish M-Score | ✅ | -2.53 (clean; threshold: < -2.22) |
M-Score of -2.53 is clean. The SGI (Sales Growth Index) of 1.123 reflects genuine organic + acquisition-driven growth. LVGI (Leverage Index) of 1.072 reflects the increase in debt. All other components are benign.
F-Score: 2.09 (elevated). The Dechow F-Score of 2.09 (probability 0.77%) is worth noting. The primary driver is the soft_assets component at 0.987 — meaning 98.7% of Roper's assets are "soft" (goodwill, intangibles, and other non-physical assets). This is the highest soft asset ratio among the companies screened and reflects Roper's acquisition-heavy model.
Altman Z-Score: 3.14 (safe zone). Despite the leverage, the Z-Score clears the 2.99 safe threshold, driven by reasonable retained earnings and a high equity-to-liabilities ratio.
Key Risks from the 10-K
1. Acquisition Dependency — The Treadmill Never Stops
Roper's three strategic pillars per the filing: Application Software, Network Software, and Technology Enabled Products — all built primarily through acquisition. Goodwill of $21.3B represents the accumulated premium paid over fair value of net assets across dozens of acquisitions.
The risk is twofold: (a) Roper must continue finding attractive acquisition targets to maintain growth, and (b) past acquisitions must continue performing to justify their carried goodwill. The filing warns that "changes in estimates or the application of alternative assumptions could produce significantly different results" in goodwill impairment testing. Customer attrition rates, revenue growth rates, and discount rates are all judgment-dependent.
2. Debt Accumulation — $9.3B and Rising
Total debt grew from $6.4B (2023) to $7.7B (2024) to $9.3B (2025). The filing shows Roper issued $2.0B in new senior notes in both 2025 and 2024 to fund acquisitions. Debt/EBITDA of 3.0x is not alarming in isolation, but the trajectory is concerning: if the next round of acquisitions adds another $2-3B in debt, leverage could approach 4x.
The Equity Investment in Indicor (a former subsidiary sold in 2022) adds complexity. Per the filing, this equity investment is "accounted for under the fair value option with its fair value estimated on a quarterly basis." A 10% decline in Indicor's value would create a ~$80M non-cash charge. The filing shows Equity investments gain of $25.5M in 2025 vs. $234.6M in 2024 — a significant decline in this volatile non-operating item.
3. Intangible Amortization Masks True Profitability (or Overstates It)
Amortization of intangible assets was $858M in 2025, $776M in 2024, and $720M in 2023 — growing as acquisitions add new intangibles. This non-cash charge reduces GAAP net income but not cash flow. Bulls argue that adjusting for intangible amortization reveals "true" earnings power; bears argue that the intangibles represent real economic cost (the purchase price of businesses) that must eventually be replaced or repurchased to maintain revenue.
The reality: Roper's recurring software revenue does not require replacement acquisitions to sustain itself (retention rates are high), but growth requires continued M&A. The $858M amortization is a cost of past growth, not a cost of maintaining the current business.
4. Customer Relationship Concentration
Per the filing, "the most significant identifiable intangible assets with definite useful economic lives recognized from our acquisitions are customer relationships." The fair value is determined using the excess earnings method, with key assumptions being "customer attrition rates, projected customer revenue growth rates, margins, contributory asset charges, and discount rates." If customer attrition at any acquired business exceeds estimates, both intangible asset values and revenue forecasts are at risk.
5. Currency and Market Risk
The filing notes: "Net revenues recognized by our companies whose functional currency is not the U.S. dollar were approximately 9% of our total net revenues in 2025." While this is modest, the equity investment in Indicor and the trading price of Roper's stock create additional exposure. The filing discloses $8.5B in fixed-rate debt at rates from 1.40% to 5.10% — a wide range reflecting multiple issuance periods.
Summary
Grade: F. Three structural flags driven by an aggressive serial acquisition strategy.
Roper Technologies is a paradox: the underlying software businesses are high quality — 69% gross margins, 57% recurring revenue, CFFO/NI of 1.65, clean M-Score. But the capital allocation strategy of perpetual debt-funded acquisitions creates three structural vulnerabilities: (1) goodwill at 156% of equity with $21.3B in impairment risk, (2) cash at only 3% of $9.3B in debt, and (3) negative post-acquisition free cash flow for three consecutive years.
This is not a fraud story — it is a capital structure story. The F grade reflects the screening engine's mechanical assessment of a balance sheet where intangible assets dwarf tangible equity. Investors who believe in Roper's ability to continue acquiring, integrating, and generating returns above cost of capital may view these flags as features, not bugs. But from a pure balance sheet risk perspective, this is one of the more levered structures in the Nasdaq-100.
