Grade: F — Major Red Flags
Framework: Schilit *Financial Shenanigans* + Beneish M-Score + forensic accounting principles
Data: SEC EDGAR 10-K (Filed November 14, 2025, fiscal year ended September 30, 2025) + Yahoo Finance
Auditor: PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP — Unqualified opinion (1 critical audit matter: revenue recognition from certain contracts with customers)
One-line verdict: Johnson Controls is a building-systems roll-up in the middle of a portfolio-simplification overhaul, and every accounting pressure point from that overhaul shows up in the 2025 numbers. Continuing-operations revenue rose 3% to $23.6 billion, but four of the 18 screening checks fail outright: receivables growing faster than sales two years running, operating cash flow collapsing to 43% of net income, cash covering only 4% of total debt ($379M cash vs $9.88B debt), and goodwill plus intangibles at 157% of equity. The filing itself tells the story: on July 31, 2025 JCI sold the Residential & Light Commercial HVAC business to Bosch for $5.6B after tax, recorded a $1.79B gain in discontinued operations that inflated reported net income to $3.29B, and ran Accelerated Share Repurchase Transactions that cost $6.78B — the "increase in cash used by financing activities was primarily due to the Accelerated Share Repurchase Transactions." Equity dropped from $16.1B to $12.9B even as the company reported record EPS. The real continuing-operations cash generation is weaker than the headline suggests. PwC's critical audit matter confirms the concern: revenue recognition on long-term cost-to-cost contracts requires "changes to the original estimates... during the life of the contract."
| Metric | Result |
|---|---|
| Red Flags | **4** (A2, C1, C4, D1) |
| Watch Items | **0** |
| Checks Completed | **17/18** |
| Beneish M-Score | **-2.28** (grey zone-adjacent) |
| Altman Z-Score | **0.80** (distress zone) |
A Portfolio-Simplification Story
From the MD&A: "On April 1, 2025, the Company... realigned into three reportable segments (Americas, EMEA and APAC) from four reportable segments (Global Products, Building Solutions North America, Building Solutions EMEA/LA and Building Solutions APAC)." This was not a cosmetic change — it coincided with JCI's ongoing "pure-play provider of comprehensive solutions for commercial buildings" strategy.
The MD&A describes three simultaneous corporate actions:
Financial Performance: Headline Number vs Continuing Operations
From the MD&A results-of-operations tables:
| Metric | FY2025 | FY2024 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Sales (cont. ops) | $23,596M | $22,952M | +3% |
| Cost of Sales | $15,004M | $14,875M | +1% |
| Gross Profit | $8,592M | $8,077M | +6% |
| Gross Margin | 36.4% | 35.2% | +1.2pp |
| SG&A | $5,764M | $5,661M | +2% |
| Restructuring & Impairment | $546M | $510M | |
| Effective Tax Rate | 12% | 7% | +5pp |
| Net Income (reported) | $3,291M | $1,705M | +93% |
Per the MD&A, organic sales growth excluding FX and M&A was 6%: "the increase in net sales was due to higher organic sales ($1,430 million), partially offset by the net impact of acquisitions and divestitures ($786 million)." Growth was led by "Services across all segments."
The headline net income is misleading. Of the $3,291M reported, $1,789M came from "income from discontinued operations, net of tax" — and per the MD&A: "The increase in income from discontinued operations, net of tax was primarily due to the gain on sale of the R&LC HVAC business." Strip out discontinued operations and continuing-operations net income is $1,502M — down modestly from $1,216M in FY2024 before pensions and other adjustments.
Restructuring and impairment costs remained elevated at $546M in FY2025 vs $510M in FY2024. The MD&A breaks this down: "Goodwill and other intangible asset impairments $206M (vs $296M in FY24), Held for sale impairments $35M, Other impairments $176M (vs $36M), Restructuring and related costs $164M (vs $143M)." The $176M of "other impairments" quadrupling year-over-year is notable.
Segment picture: Americas (the largest) net sales were $15,831M vs $15,606M with Segment EBIT up 10% to $2,526M. EMEA $4,968M (up 8%) with EBIT up 21% to $581M. APAC $2,797M (up 3%) with EBIT flat at $461M — per the MD&A, "APAC was consistent with the prior year as increases in volume were offset by pricing challenges."
Cash Flow: The C1 Failure
From the MD&A cash flow table (continuing operations):
| Metric | FY2025 | FY2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Cash from Operating Activities | $2,554M | $1,568M |
| Cash Used in Investing | ($412M) | ($184M) |
| Cash Used in Financing | ($6,784M) | ($1,948M) |
| Cash from Discontinued Ops | $4,787M | $361M |
The MD&A summary: "The increase in cash provided by operating activities reflects higher net income and favorable changes in accounts receivable, partially offset by the timing of accrued income tax payments." And: "The increase in cash used by financing activities was primarily due to the Accelerated Share Repurchase Transactions ('ASR Transactions')."
But the screening engine data (from Yahoo Finance's total-company view) tells a different story:
| Metric | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1,399M | $2,100M | $2,218M | $1,988M |
| Net Income | $3,291M | $1,705M | $1,850M | $1,527M |
| **CFFO / Net Income** | **0.43** | **1.23** | **1.20** | **1.30** |
The sharp deterioration in CFFO/NI to 0.43 drives the C1 failure. This is because reported net income includes the $1.79B discontinued-operations gain (a non-cash accounting gain on the Bosch sale), while operating cash flow on a total-company basis now excludes R&LC HVAC. The headline ratio is worse than the underlying business.
A2 also fails — AR outpaced revenue for two consecutive years. Accounts receivable grew from $6,051M to $6,269M even as the R&LC HVAC business was carved out mid-year, suggesting that AR in the continuing business rose materially relative to the sales base.
Balance Sheet: Leverage + Low Cash
From the MD&A capitalization table (September 30, 2025):
| Item | FY2025 | FY2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Short-term debt | $723M | $953M |
| Current portion of LT debt | $566M | $536M |
| Long-term debt | $8,591M | $8,004M |
| **Total debt** | **$9,880M** | **$9,493M** |
| Cash | $379M | $606M |
| Net debt | $9,501M | $8,887M |
| **Shareholders' equity** | **$12,927M** | **$16,098M** |
| Total debt / Total cap | 43.3% | 37.1% |
Equity dropped $3.2B despite a reported $3.3B of net income — that drop is the $6.78B of ASR share repurchases reducing equity. The company turned a $5.6B divestiture into a buyback, a move that immediately re-leveraged the balance sheet.
C4 fails: cash of $379M covers only 4% of total debt of $9,880M. This is after $5.6B of proceeds from the Bosch sale flowed through — in other words, the company had $5.6B in hand mid-year and spent essentially all of it on buybacks rather than debt reduction.
D1 fails: goodwill plus intangibles equal $20.2B against $12.9B of equity (157% of equity). JCI is a legacy of the 2016 Johnson Controls–Tyco merger plus subsequent M&A, and the goodwill is a direct legacy of that consolidation. The 10-K's Critical Audit Matter implicitly points at the same risk — long-term contract estimation — but the more mechanical risk is goodwill impairment, and the $206M of goodwill/intangible impairments in FY2025 plus $296M in FY2024 show the write-down cycle is already active.
Altman Z-Score of 0.80 falls firmly in the distress zone (below 1.81), a combined reflection of high debt, low working capital (working capital is negative at -$779M), and book equity erosion.
The 18-Point Screening
Revenue Quality
| # | Check | Result | Detail |
|---|---|---|---|
| A1 | DSO Change | PASS | DSO stable |
| A2 | AR vs Revenue Growth | **FAIL** | AR outpaced revenue for 2 consecutive years |
| A3 | Revenue vs CFFO | PASS | Revenue +2.8%, CFFO -33.4% flagged elsewhere |
The A2 failure is the most telling revenue-quality signal. With the company carving out the R&LC HVAC business mid-year, AR should be moving down (fewer customers in the base). Instead it rose from $6,051M to $6,269M.
Expense Quality
| # | Check | Result | Detail |
|---|---|---|---|
| B1 | Inventory vs COGS | PASS | Inventory +2.6% vs COGS +0.9% |
| B2 | CapEx vs Revenue | PASS | |
| B3 | SG&A Ratio | PASS | |
| B4 | Gross Margin | PASS | 36.4%, +1.2pp — improvement |
Gross margin improved 120bps per the MD&A "due to margin improvements in Products and Systems and increased volumes for both Products and Systems and Services." This is a genuine positive but the pricing power may be fragile given the tariff exposure called out in the MD&A.
Cash Flow Quality
| # | Check | Result | Detail |
|---|---|---|---|
| C1 | CFFO vs Net Income | **FAIL** | CFFO/NI = 0.43. Only 43% of profit backed by cash |
| C2 | Free Cash Flow | PASS | |
| C3 | Accruals Ratio | PASS | |
| C4 | Cash vs Debt | **FAIL** | Cash $379M covers only 4% of debt $9,880M |
Balance Sheet
| # | Check | Result | Detail |
|---|---|---|---|
| D1 | Goodwill + Intangibles | **FAIL** | $20.2B = 157% of equity |
| D2 | Leverage | PASS | |
| D3 | Soft Asset Growth | PASS | |
| D4 | Asset Impairment | N/A |
Acquisition Risk
| # | Check | Result | Detail |
|---|---|---|---|
| E1 | Serial Acquirer FCF | PASS | |
| E2 | Goodwill Surge | PASS |
Manipulation Score
| # | Check | Result | Detail |
|---|---|---|---|
| F1 | Beneish M-Score | PASS | -2.28 (just below the -2.22 flag threshold) |
M-Score components: DSRI 1.008, GMI 0.966, AQI 0.989, SGI 1.028, DEPI 0.896, SGAI 0.990, TATA 0.0499, LVGI 1.101. The positive TATA of 0.05 means working-capital accruals were positive — earnings exceeded cash flow — which aligns with the C1 failure. LVGI at 1.101 shows rising leverage. DEPI below 1.0 points to accelerating depreciation. Individually each is benign, but as a cluster they form a coherent pattern: profits are rising, cash is lagging, leverage is building.
Key Risks from the 10-K
1. AFFF/PFAS Legacy Firefighting Foam Litigation
The risk factors flag: "Governments in the United States and internationally have increasingly been regulating perfluorooctane sulfonate ('PFOS'), perfluorooctanoic acid ('PFOA'), and/or other per- and poly-fluoroalkyl substances ('PFAS'), which were contained in certain of the Company's legacy firefighting foam products." The MD&A explicitly notes "the net favorable impact of the prior year water systems AFFF settlement and related insurance recoveries ($422 million)." This means the FY2024 comparable period was helped by a one-time AFFF settlement credit — making FY2025 SG&A growth look worse than operations alone would suggest.
2. Tariff Exposure
The MD&A contains an unusually prominent tariff discussion: "The United States has announced tariffs and reciprocal tariffs on a wide range of products manufactured or produced worldwide... Although the Company has been largely able to mitigate the impact of tariffs that have been enacted to date, if additional tariffs and reciprocal tariffs are implemented (whether as currently proposed or otherwise), such actions could negatively impact the Company's revenue growth and margins in future periods through decreased sales and increased cost of goods sold." JCI manufactures globally and sells in 150+ countries, so reciprocal tariffs hit both input costs and export prices.
3. Critical Audit Matter: Long-Term Contract Revenue Recognition
PwC's critical audit matter is revenue recognition on long-term contracts: "Revenue from certain long-term contracts to design, manufacture and install building products and systems as well as unscheduled repair or replacement services is recognized on an over time basis, with progress towards completion measured using a cost-to-cost input method based on the relationship between actual costs incurred and total estimated costs at completion. Changes to the original estimates may be required during the life of the contract and estimated losses are recorded when identified." Cost-to-cost revenue recognition is inherently subject to estimation manipulation — a company that revises estimated total costs downward can book immediate margin.
4. Portfolio Simplification Execution Risk
From Item 1A: "We may not realize the benefits of our ongoing efforts to simplify our portfolio... Divestitures such as these involve risks, including difficulties in the separation of operations, services, products and personnel, the diversion of management's attention from other business concerns, the disruption of our business, the potential loss of key employees and the retention of uncertain environmental or other contingent liabilities related to the divested business." And: "Some divestitures, including the divestiture of our R&LC HVAC business, are or may be dilutive to earnings." Management acknowledges the R&LC sale is dilutive to earnings. The buyback is an attempt to offset that dilution via share count reduction, but it was funded with 100% of the proceeds rather than with free cash flow.
5. Cybersecurity Incident History
The risk factors disclose: "During September 2023, we experienced a cybersecurity event where certain data, primarily employee, job applicant and personal information and other related data, was impacted." A prior breach has already been disclosed as material.
6. Goodwill Impairment Recurrence
The MD&A's restructuring/impairment table shows goodwill and intangible impairments of $206M in FY2025 and $296M in FY2024 — both years. This is a recurring pattern, not a one-time cleanup, and with goodwill at 157% of equity, another material impairment would drive equity down further.
7. China/APAC Weakness
Per the risk factors: "during fiscal year 2024 and fiscal 2025, our results of operations were impacted by the softening of economic conditions in China, negatively impacting the performance of the APAC segment." APAC segment EBIT was flat at $461M despite 3% revenue growth — pricing power is constrained in the region.
Summary
Grade: F. Four hard fails (A2, C1, C4, D1) and a Z-Score in the distress zone make this the most structurally strained name in the FY2025 industrial screening set.
The hidden story in this 10-K is the use of a $5.6B divestiture windfall. Rather than deleveraging a balance sheet with $9.9B of debt, JCI put essentially all of it into an Accelerated Share Repurchase — $6.78B in buyback-related financing outflows. That shrank equity from $16.1B to $12.9B, pushed goodwill/equity from 125% to 157%, and left cash at $379M covering just 4% of debt. The Bosch sale's $1.79B accounting gain inflated reported net income to $3.29B, but once you strip discontinued operations, continuing-operations earnings look unremarkable. And operating cash flow at the Yahoo Finance level fell to $1.4B, producing a CFFO/NI ratio of 0.43.
Management's actions are defensible as a capital-allocation choice in a rising-rate environment — using windfall proceeds to retire shares at what they believe is an attractive price. But from a forensic-screening standpoint, it produces an accounting profile that simultaneously fails revenue-quality (A2), cash-flow quality (C1), liquidity (C4), and balance-sheet (D1) tests. The PwC critical audit matter on long-term contract revenue recognition adds a layer of estimation risk that will be worth monitoring as the restructuring continues through FY2026 and FY2027. Add in the 160bp tariff headwind called out in the MD&A and the AFFF/PFAS legacy liability, and there is little margin for a misstep in the next two fiscal years.
**Disclaimer**: This report is based on Johnson Controls International's FY2025 10-K filed with SEC EDGAR. This is NOT investment advice.
Data: SEC EDGAR 10-K + Yahoo Finance
Auditor: PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (Unqualified opinion, 1 critical audit matter — revenue recognition from certain contracts with customers)
Fiscal year ended: September 30, 2025
