D

DoorDash (DASH) 2025 — Grade D: Deliveroo Deal, Goodwill Surged 175%

DASH·2025·English

Grade: D — Significant Concerns

Framework: Schilit *Financial Shenanigans* + Beneish M-Score + forensic accounting principles

Data: SEC EDGAR 10-K (Year ended December 31, 2025) + Yahoo Finance

Auditor: KPMG LLP, San Francisco, CA (Auditor Firm ID: 185) — Clean opinion

One-line verdict: DoorDash turned its first meaningful profit -- the 10-K shows revenue of $13,717 million (up 28% YoY) and net income of $935 million after years of losses. But two red flags and two watch items demand scrutiny. AR outpaced revenue for two consecutive years. Goodwill + intangibles surged 175% to $7.8B (78% of equity) after a $4.2B acquisition year. CapEx growth of 83% is 3x revenue growth. And the company issued $2.7B in convertible notes while simultaneously authorizing $5B in share repurchases. The profitability is real, but the balance sheet transformation from acquisitions and debt issuance warrants deep investigation.

MetricResult
Red Flags**2** (AR outpacing revenue 2 years; Goodwill + Intangibles = 78% of equity)
Watch Items**2** (CapEx growth 83% vs revenue 28%; Goodwill surge 175% YoY)
Checks Completed**17/18** (1 N/A)
Beneish M-Score**-2.35** (below -2.22 threshold -- unlikely manipulator, but close)
F-Score (Fraud Probability)**1.3** (0.48% probability)
Altman Z-Score**1.46** (grey zone -- monitor solvency)
AuditorKPMG LLP -- Unqualified opinion
Fiscal Year2025 (ended December 31, 2025)
Report Date2026-04-05

The Business: From Food Delivery to Local Commerce Platform

Per the 10-K, DoorDash is the leading local commerce platform in the U.S. The company's risk factor section states: "Since launching in 2013, we have expanded our platform features and services, expanded into new categories, changed our pricing methodologies, and entered new geographies."

The filing reveals the scale of the Deliveroo acquisition: DoorDash entered into a "$2.85 billion" Bridge Term Loan to fund the transaction, though both tranches were subsequently terminated, suggesting the deal was financed through other means including the $2.7B convertible notes issuance.

Profitability: First Real Profit Year

Per the consolidated statements of operations:

MetricFY2023FY2024FY2025Trend
Revenue$8,635M$10,722M$13,717M+27.9% YoY
Cost of Revenue$4,589M$5,542M$6,738M+21.6%
**Gross Profit**$4,046M$5,180M**$6,979M**+34.7%
**Gross Margin**46.9%48.3%**50.9%**+2.6pp YoY
Operating Income (Loss)($579M)($38M)**$723M**First operating profit
Net Income (Loss)($558M)$123M**$935M**+660%
Diluted EPS($1.42)$0.29**$2.13**--
S&M Expense$1,876M$2,037M$2,476M+21.6%
R&D Expense$1,003M$1,168M$1,431M+22.5%
G&A Expense$1,235M$1,452M$1,600M+10.2%
D&A$509M$561M$747M+33.2%

The inflection is dramatic. DoorDash went from a $579M operating loss in 2023 to $723M operating income in 2025 -- a $1.3B swing in two years. Gross margin crossed 50% for the first time, reflecting scale economics in the delivery marketplace.

However, operating expenses remain elevated. Total costs and expenses were $12,994M against $13,717M revenue -- a razor-thin 5.3% operating margin. Sales and marketing alone consumed $2,476M (18% of revenue). This is a business that must spend heavily to maintain its market position.

Cash Flow: Strong Generation, Heavy Investment

Per the 10-K cash flow disclosures:

MetricFY2023FY2024FY2025
Operating Cash Flow~$1,600M$2,115M$2,411M
Net Income($558M)$123M$935M
**CFFO / Net Income**N/M17.3x**2.60**
Free Cash Flow----$1,806M

The 10-K states: "Cash used in investing activities was $4.4 billion for 2025, which primarily consisted of cash paid for acquisitions, net of cash acquired, of $4.2 billion, purchases of investments of $1.4 billion, purchases of property and equipment of $257 million, cash outflows for capitalized software and website development costs of $348 million."

The CFFO/NI ratio of 2.60 looks healthy on the surface, but the prior year's ratio of 17.3x (with only $123M net income) and the year before's negative NI make the trend hard to evaluate. This is a company just entering profitability -- the cash flow pattern needs more history to establish reliability.

Financing Surge

The 10-K discloses: "Cash provided by financing activities was $2.4 billion for 2025, which primarily consisted of proceeds from issuance of the 2030 Notes of $2.7 billion, proceeds from issuance of warrants of $341 million... partially offset by purchase of convertible note hedges of $680 million."

DoorDash issued $2.7B in convertible notes due 2030 while simultaneously authorizing $5B in share repurchases. This is an unusual capital allocation pattern -- borrowing to buy back stock before the business has established consistent profitability. As the filing states: "we may require additional capital resources" and "we may not be able to consistently maintain or increase profitability in the future."

Balance Sheet

ItemFY2024FY2025
Cash + Short-term Investments$5,341M$5,506M
Total Debt (Convertible Notes)--$2,724M
Goodwill$2,315M**$5,519M**
Intangible Assets$510M**$2,260M**
Total Assets$12,845M$19,659M
Accumulated Deficit($5,255M)($4,320M)
**Total Stockholders' Equity**$7,803M**$10,033M**

Total assets grew 53% year-over-year -- from $12.8B to $19.7B -- almost entirely from acquisitions ($4.2B cash for acquisitions) and the convertible debt issuance. Goodwill more than doubled from $2.3B to $5.5B. Intangible assets quadrupled from $510M to $2.3B. The company still carries $4.3B in accumulated deficit.

The 18-Point Screening

A. Revenue Quality

#CheckResultDetail
A1DSO ChangePASSDSO 29 days, +5 days YoY. Normal
A2AR vs Revenue Growth**FAIL**AR outpaced revenue for 2 consecutive years
A3Revenue vs CFFOPASSRevenue +27.9%, CFFO +14.0%. Cash follows revenue

A2 is a red flag. Accounts receivable grew from $732M to $1,108M (+51.4%) while revenue grew 27.9%. This is the second consecutive year AR has outrun revenue. In a marketplace business where merchants and consumers pay in near-real-time, a persistent AR build-up raises questions about revenue recognition timing. The DSO expansion from 25 to 30 days is not extreme, but the two-year trend is a legitimate forensic concern.

B. Expense Quality

#CheckResultDetail
B1Inventory vs COGSPASSNo material inventory
B2CapEx vs Revenue**WATCH**CapEx growth 83.3% is >2x revenue growth 27.9%
B3SG&A RatioPASSSG&A / Gross Profit = 58.4%. Normal for growth stage
B4Gross MarginPASS50.9%, +2.6pp YoY. Steadily improving

On B2: CapEx + capitalized software costs surged -- property and equipment purchases of $257M plus $348M in capitalized software = $605M total capital investment, up significantly. For a platform business, this level of capital intensity warrants explanation. The 10-K attributes this to infrastructure build-out for international expansion and new verticals.

C. Cash Flow Quality

#CheckResultDetail
C1CFFO vs Net IncomePASSCFFO/NI = 2.60. Cash-backed earnings
C2Free Cash FlowPASSFCF $1,806M, FCF/NI = 1.95
C3Accruals RatioPASS-7.6%. Low accruals
C4Cash vs DebtPASS$5,506M cash vs $3,290M debt. 1.67x coverage

Cash flow quality checks are clean. The negative accruals ratio and strong FCF conversion suggest the reported profitability is real.

D. Balance Sheet

#CheckResultDetail
D1Goodwill + Intangibles**FAIL****$7,779M = 78% of equity. Over 50%**
D2LeveragePASSDebt/EBITDA = 2.2x. Manageable
D3Soft Asset GrowthPASSOther assets +41.8% vs revenue +27.9%. Normal given acquisitions
D4Asset ImpairmentN/ANo write-off data

D1 is a major red flag. Goodwill of $5,519M + intangible assets of $2,260M = $7,779M, representing 78% of equity. This is almost entirely new -- goodwill was only $2,315M a year ago. The $3.2B goodwill increase and $1.75B intangibles increase came from 2025 acquisitions totaling $4.2B in cash. If these acquired businesses (including Deliveroo operations) underperform, impairment charges could be material. Unlike EA's static legacy goodwill, this is fresh acquisition risk.

E. Acquisition Risk

#CheckResultDetail
E1Serial Acquirer FCFPASSFCF after acquisitions positive
E2Goodwill Surge**WATCH**Goodwill + intangibles surged 175% YoY

The 175% surge in goodwill + intangibles is driven by the Deliveroo transaction and other 2025 acquisitions. The company's own risk factors acknowledge: "If we are unable to make acquisitions and investments, or successfully integrate acquisitions into our business, our business, financial condition, and results of operations could be adversely affected."

F. Manipulation Detection

#CheckResultDetail
F1Beneish M-ScorePASS**-2.35** (below -2.22 threshold, but close)

M-Score Component Breakdown:

ComponentValueWhat It MeasuresConcern?
DSRI1.183Receivables growing faster than revenueModerate
GMI0.950Gross margin improvingGood
**AQI****1.448****Asset quality deteriorating -- soft assets ballooning****Elevated**
**SGI****1.279****28% revenue growth****Expected for growth company**
DEPI0.978Depreciation stableNormal
SGAI0.913SG&A improving as % of revenueGood
TATA-0.076Low accrualsGood
**LVGI****1.306****Leverage increasing -- convertible notes issuance****Elevated**

The M-Score of -2.35 passes the -2.22 threshold but barely. The AQI of 1.448 (driven by the acquisition-fueled asset growth) and LVGI of 1.306 (driven by the $2.7B convertible notes) are both elevated. One more year of acquisition-driven asset growth could push the M-Score above the manipulation threshold.

Key Risks from the 10-K (Item 1A)

1. Profitability Not Guaranteed

The 10-K explicitly warns: "We have a history of net losses, we anticipate increasing expenses in the future, and we may not be able to consistently maintain or increase profitability in the future." DoorDash accumulated $4.3B in deficit. One year of profit does not establish a pattern.

2. Dasher Classification Risk

The filing states: "If Dashers that utilize our platform as independent contractors are reclassified as employees under U.S. federal or state law, or the laws of other jurisdictions in which we operate, it could have an adverse effect that is material to our business." The EU's Platform Work Directive "requires EU member states to transpose its requirements to their national laws, including enacting new national laws for determining worker classification." In Finland, a court already ruled courier partners were employees. This risk is existential to the operating model.

3. Integration Risk from Acquisitions

DoorDash spent $4.2B on acquisitions in 2025, adding Deliveroo and other operations. The filing warns that integration "will require us to continue to expand our operational and financial infrastructure" and "effectively integrate, develop, and motivate a large number of new employees, while maintaining the beneficial aspects of our culture."

4. Founder Voting Control

The 10-K discloses: "The multi-class structure of our common stock and the voting agreement... has the effect of concentrating voting power with Tony Xu, our co-founder, Chief Executive Officer, and Chair of our board of directors, which will limit your ability to influence the outcome of matters submitted to our stockholders for approval."

5. Intense Competition and Customer Retention Costs

The filing warns: "We face intense competition and if we are unable to compete effectively, our business, financial condition, and results of operations could be adversely affected." DoorDash spent $2,476M on sales and marketing in 2025 -- 18% of revenue. This is the cost of maintaining market position in a business with low switching costs.

Key Financial Trends (4-Year)

MetricFY2022FY2023FY2024FY2025
Revenue--$8,635M$10,722M$13,717M
Net Income--($558M)$123M$935M
Gross Margin45.5%46.9%48.3%50.9%
Net Margin---6.5%1.1%6.8%
CFFO--~$1,600M$2,115M$2,411M
CFFO/NI--N/M17.3x2.60
FCF------$1,806M
Cash----$5,341M$5,506M
Total Debt------$3,290M

Summary

Grade: D. Two red flags and two watch items signal significant concerns that require thorough investigation.

DoorDash's profitability inflection is real -- revenue grew 28% to $13.7B, gross margin crossed 50%, and the company posted its first meaningful operating profit ($723M) and net income ($935M). Cash flow quality metrics (CFFO/NI 2.60, accruals ratio -7.6%) are clean. The M-Score of -2.35 passes the manipulation threshold.

But the balance sheet transformation is alarming. Goodwill + intangibles surged from $2.8B to $7.8B (175% increase) from $4.2B in acquisitions, now representing 78% of equity. AR outpaced revenue for two consecutive years. The company issued $2.7B in convertible debt while authorizing $5B in buybacks -- financial engineering before the business has proven sustainable profitability. The Z-Score of 1.46 sits in the grey zone.

The 10-K's own risk factors are unusually candid: "We have a history of net losses... we may not be able to consistently maintain or increase profitability in the future." The Dasher classification risk from EU regulations is existential. The Deliveroo integration is unproven. One bad year could send this company back to losses with a much heavier balance sheet than before.

This is a company at an inflection point. The operating momentum is genuine. The financial engineering and acquisition risk are the concerns.

**Disclaimer**: This report is based on DoorDash's fiscal year 2025 10-K filed with the SEC. This is NOT investment advice.

**About EarningsGrade**: We screen earnings reports for financial red flags using an 18-point forensic framework. Grade D means significant concerns were detected that warrant thorough investigation.

This report is based on SEC 10-K filings and public financial data. Not investment advice.

DoorDash (DASH) 2025 — Grade D: Deliveroo Deal, Goodwill Surged 175% — EarningsGrade