C

Cencora (COR) 2025 Earnings Quality Report

COR·2025·English

Grade: C — Some Red Flags, Investigate

Framework: Schilit *Financial Shenanigans* + Beneish M-Score + forensic accounting principles

Data: SEC EDGAR 10-K (Filed 2025-11-25) + Yahoo Finance

Auditor: Ernst & Young LLP — Clean opinion (served since 1985)

Fiscal Year: 2025 (ended September 30, 2025)

One-line verdict: Cencora, one of the three major US pharmaceutical wholesalers, grew revenue 9.3% to $321.3B and generated $3.9B in operating cash flow — but the 2025 story is dominated by the $4.0B January 2025 acquisition of Retina Consultants of America, which drove goodwill up 47% from $9.3B to $13.7B and pushed goodwill+intangibles to an extreme 1,157% of the tiny $1.5B of common equity (distorted by legacy buybacks). Cencora also wrote off the remaining $723.9M of PharmaLex goodwill — the second impairment of that 2023 acquisition (prior year: $418M). The C grade reflects that two of the four red-flag signals (goodwill ratio, goodwill surge) come from this one RCA deal, while the underlying cash conversion ratio of 2.49x is strong and M-Score is a clean -2.54. EY's two Critical Audit Matters both relate to opioid litigation exposure — $3.9B in accrued litigation liability sits on the balance sheet.

MetricResult
Red Flags**1** (Goodwill+Intangibles 1,157% of equity)
Watch Items**3** (CapEx surged 37%; cash covers 57% of debt; goodwill surge 31%)
Checks Completed**17/18**
Beneish M-Score**-2.54** (safe zone)
Z-Score**0.06** (distress zone — distorted by thin common equity after buybacks)

The RCA Acquisition: $4.0B for an 85% Stake

This is the single most important event in Cencora's 2025 10-K. From Note 2:

"On January 2, 2025, the Company acquired an 85% interest in Retina Consultants of America (RCA) for $4,042.0 million in cash, $694.4 million of contingent consideration related to equity units for certain RCA physicians and members of management that retained the remaining 15% interest in RCA, $545.7 million for the settlement of a net receivable resulting from a pre-existing commercial relationship between us and RCA, and $393.1 million for contingent consideration payable to the sellers associated with RCA's achievement of certain predetermined business objectives in fiscal 2027 and fiscal 2028."

Total deal consideration: $4.04B cash + $0.69B retained equity contingent + $0.55B pre-existing receivable settlement + $0.39B earn-out = $5.7B enterprise value for RCA — a specialty ophthalmology physician network focused on retina care. The deal was funded via "a combination of cash on hand and new debt financing" per the 10-K.

The accounting impact is visible across the balance sheet:

Line ItemFY2024FY2025Change
Goodwill$9,318M**$13,677M****+$4,359M (+47%)**
Short-term debt$576M$118M($458M)
Long-term debt$3,812M**$7,543M****+$3,731M (+98%)**
Other liabilities$1,994M$3,640M+$1,646M
Cash and equivalents$3,133M**$4,356M**+$1,223M

The engine's E2 check triggered WATCH: "Goodwill+Intangibles surged 31% YoY" — that's the mechanical signal for a major acquisition.

Cencora's strategic rationale from Note 2: "The Company believes the acquisition of RCA allows it to broaden its relationships with community providers and to build on its leadership in specialty pharmaceuticals within its U.S. Healthcare Solutions reportable segment." Retina pharmaceuticals (particularly anti-VEGF injectables like Eylea and Lucentis) are among the highest-spend specialty drug categories in US healthcare. Owning the physician practice lets Cencora capture margin across both the drug distribution and the administration fee.

Further disclosure of the earn-out mechanic: the $393.1M fiscal 2027–2028 contingent consideration "provides for the potential payment to the sellers of up to $500 million in the aggregate" — meaning RCA management is incentivized to hit targets that could push total cost to $6.2B+.

During fiscal 2025, acquisition-related expenses hit $291M (up from $103M), including $121.7M tied to RCA equity unit compensation features that are "expensed ratably over a period of 1.5 years."

Revenue and Profitability

From the Consolidated Statements of Operations (fiscal year ended September 30, 2025):

Line Item202520242023
Revenue**$321,332.8M**$293,958.6M$262,173.4M
Cost of goods sold$309,854.3M$284,048.6M$253,213.9M
Gross profit**$11,478.5M**$9,910.0M$8,959.5M
Distribution, selling, and administrative$6,493.8M$5,661.1M$5,310.0M
Depreciation$494.1M$428.5M$410.3M
Amortization$556.9M$663.5M$553.6M
Litigation and opioid-related expenses$60.7M$227.1M($24.7M)
Acquisition-related deal and integration**$291.0M**$103.0M$139.7M
Restructuring and other$229.4M$233.6M$229.9M
**Goodwill impairment****$723.9M****$418.0M**
Operating income$2,628.6M$2,175.2M$2,340.7M
Interest expense, net$291.5M$157.0M$228.9M
Income tax expense$690.5M$484.7M$428.3M
**Net income****$1,567.8M****$1,519.3M****$1,732.6M**
Diluted EPS$7.96$7.53$8.53

Revenue grew 9.3% to $321.3B. Gross profit grew 15.8% — outpacing revenue, helped by RCA (specialty pharmaceuticals have higher margins than wholesale). But operating income grew only 20.8% despite strong gross profit growth, because the combined hit from PharmaLex goodwill impairment ($723.9M), acquisition-related costs ($291.0M, +$188.0M YoY), depreciation increase, and interest expense nearly doubling ($291.5M vs $157.0M from the RCA debt financing) absorbed much of the operating leverage.

Gross profit margin is tiny for a reason. Pharmaceutical wholesale is a razor-thin business by design: 3.6% gross margin in 2025, up from 3.4% in 2024. A 20-basis-point move matters enormously. The 10-K's MD&A explains the SG&A growth: "Distribution, selling, and administrative expenses increased by $832.7 million, or 14.7%, from the prior fiscal year primarily due to the January 2025 acquisition of RCA and to support our revenue growth. As a percentage of revenue, distribution, selling, and administrative expenses were 2.02% in the current fiscal year and represent an increase of 9 basis points compared to the prior fiscal year primarily due to the January 2025 acquisition of RCA."

The PharmaLex Double-Dip Impairment

Cencora wrote off the entire remaining goodwill for PharmaLex in fiscal 2025. From the 10-K: "In the fourth quarter of fiscal 2025 and in connection with the Company's annual budgeting process, the Company revised PharmaLex's long-range forecast. In connection with the Company's annual goodwill impairment assessment, it recorded a full impairment of the remaining goodwill of $723.9 million in the PharmaLex reporting unit."

PharmaLex was acquired in January 2023 as part of Cencora's International Healthcare Solutions pharma services business. In fiscal 2024, Cencora wrote down $418M. In fiscal 2025, the remaining $723.9M went to zero. Combined, $1.14B of goodwill from a single 2023 acquisition has now been written off. The 10-K provides little specific detail on why PharmaLex underperformed beyond the "revised long-range forecast" language — but two impairments in two consecutive years on a single unit is notable.

This is important context for the fresh $4.4B of RCA goodwill: Cencora's recent track record on international services acquisitions is poor. Management is confident in the RCA thesis, but investors should demand proof.

Balance Sheet: Thin Common Equity, Heavy Float

Item20242025
Cash and cash equivalents$3,132.6M**$4,356.1M**
Accounts receivable, net$23,871.8M$25,225.3M
Inventories$18,998.8M$20,492.5M
Goodwill$9,318.0M**$13,676.5M**
Other intangible assets$4,001.0M$3,774.2M
**Total assets****$67,101.7M****$76,590.1M**
Accounts payable$50,942.2M**$54,719.8M**
Short-term debt$576.3M$117.8M
Long-term debt$3,811.7M**$7,543.0M**
Accrued litigation liability$4,296.9M**$3,881.3M**
Common equity attributable to Cencora**$645.9M****$1,508.0M**
Total stockholders' equity (incl. NCI)$786.7M$1,747.1M

The common stockholders' equity of just $1.5B against $76.6B of total assets is a direct result of decades of aggressive share buybacks reducing treasury stock at cost to $10.3B. It is not a sign of financial distress. The engine's D1 check flagged "Goodwill+Intangibles $17.5B = 1,157% of equity" — technically accurate, but the denominator is nearly meaningless for a wholesaler with $54.7B of payables float.

Net debt = $7.66B total debt − $4.36B cash = $3.30B. For a $321B revenue wholesaler, that's modest. Debt/EBITDA per the engine is 2.0x (Healthy).

Accounts payable of $54.7B is the real leverage — Cencora funds its inventory by extending payables to pharma manufacturers, which is why net working capital is minimal and ROIC looks attractive. This is a feature of the pharmaceutical distribution model, not a red flag.

Cash Flow: $3.9B OCF but Buried by RCA

Item202320242025
Net income$1,732.6M$1,519.3M$1,567.8M
Depreciation$418.8M$448.2M$501.3M
Amortization$562.0M$670.6M$567.1M
Impairment of assets, incl. goodwill$418.0M**$837.4M**
RCA equity unit adjustments$121.7M
LIFO (credit) expense$204.6M($52.2M)($76.9M)
Change in AR($2,711.8M)($2,784.3M)**($1,923.4M)**
Change in inventories($2,183.4M)($1,479.6M)($1,269.4M)
Change in AP+$6,103.5M+$4,968.1M+$3,693.4M
Change in long-term accrued litigation($400.0M)($506.2M)($404.1M)
**Net cash provided by operating activities****$3,911.3M****$3,484.7M****$3,875.1M**
Capital expenditures($458.4M)($487.2M)**($668.0M)**
Cost of acquired companies($1,409.8M)($69.8M)**($4,095.6M)**
Equity investments($743.3M)($30.4M)($196.2M)
Senior notes borrowings$157.5M$688.3M**$4,508.5M**
Senior notes repayments($811.4M)($662.5M)($1,280.6M)
Purchases of common stock($1,180.7M)($1,491.4M)**($435.5M)**
Cash dividends($398.8M)($416.2M)($437.1M)

Operating cash flow of $3.9B is healthy and in line with the three-year range. Free cash flow (OCF − CapEx) of ~$3.2B supports the dividend ($437M) and modest buyback ($435M). But Cencora deployed $4.1B on the RCA acquisition and another $196M on equity investments — all funded with the $4.5B of new senior notes.

The CFFO/NI ratio of 2.49 reflects the massive non-cash amortization and depreciation charges inherent to this business. Engine notes: "Profits backed by cash."

Capital expenditures jumped 37% to $668M. The engine's B2 check flagged this as WATCH: "CapEx growth 37.1% is >2x revenue growth 9.3%" — the increase is consistent with RCA integration investment, not necessarily a distress signal.

Auditor: EY — Two CAMs, Both Opioid-Related

Ernst & Young has audited Cencora since 1985. Clean opinion. EY identified two Critical Audit Matters — both relating to opioid litigation:

1. Legal Matters and Contingencies — Opioid Lawsuits and Investigations

From the audit report: "The Company is involved in a significant number of lawsuits and government investigations relating to the distribution of prescription opioid pain medications and other controlled substances...Auditing management's determination of whether the risk of loss related to opioid litigation and investigations is probable and reasonably estimable, and the related disclosures is highly subjective and requires significant judgment. Auditing management's judgments related to unsettled cases was challenging due to the significant judgment applied in determining the likelihood of resolution of matters through settlement or litigation and the magnitude of the liability."

The balance sheet carries $3.88B in accrued litigation liability — explicitly labeled as "Accrued litigation liability" — primarily for opioid matters. EY's procedures included testing "internal controls that address the risks of material misstatement related to the completeness and presentation and disclosure of the opioid litigation and investigations liability and uncertain tax position."

2. Income tax benefit related to opioid settlements

Secondary to the first CAM: "The Company used significant judgment in measuring the amount of income tax benefit that may ultimately be deductible for U.S. federal and state purposes." Cencora records a tax benefit against the opioid liability, but the deductibility of settlement payments is itself an uncertain tax position.

The opioid liability is the single largest contingent exposure not reflected in current operating results. In fiscal 2025, Cencora paid down $404.1M of the long-term accrued litigation liability (from $4.3B to $3.9B). This is visible on the cash flow statement as a negative working-capital adjustment. The payments will continue for years.

Customer Concentration: Walgreens at 25% of Revenue

From Item 1A: "Walgreens and Boots together accounted for approximately 25% of our revenue in fiscal 2025 and, as of September 30, 2025, accounted for approximately 38% of our accounts receivable, net. Evernorth Health Services accounted for approximately 13% of our revenue in fiscal 2025. Our top ten customers, including governmental agencies, represented approximately 66% of revenue in fiscal 2025."

25% of revenue from one customer is high concentration. The 10-K then discloses an important recent event: "On August 28, 2025, Sycamore Partners, a private equity firm, acquired Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc. (WBA). We have a distribution agreement in the U.S. pursuant to which we distribute pharmaceuticals to Walgreens pharmacies as well as a generics purchasing services arrangement under which Walgreens Boots Alliance Development GmbH (WBAD) provides a variety of services to us, including negotiating acquisition pricing with generic manufacturers on our behalf. Each of these agreements has a stated term that does not expire until 2029."

So the good news is the contracts run to 2029; the bad news is that Sycamore, a PE firm known for aggressive restructuring, may "seek changes to WBA's operations or our relationship with WBA." At 25% of revenue, any adverse renegotiation would hit Cencora materially.

18-Point Screening

Revenue Quality

#CheckResultDetail
A1DSOPASSDSO 29 days, change -1 day YoY
A2AR vs RevenuePASSAR growth 5.7% vs revenue 9.3%
A3Revenue vs CFFOPASSRevenue 9.3%, CFFO 11.2%. Cash follows revenue

Expense Quality

#CheckResultDetail
B1InventoryPASSInventory 7.9% vs COGS 9.1%. Normal
B2CapEx**WATCH****CapEx growth 37.1% is >2x revenue growth 9.3%** (RCA investment)
B3SG&A RatioPASSSG&A/Gross Profit = 56.6%. Normal
B4Gross MarginPASSGross margin 3.6%, change +0.2pp. Stable

Cash Flow Quality

#CheckResultDetail
C1CFFO vs NIPASSCFFO/NI = 2.49. Profits backed by cash
C2FCFPASS$3.2B FCF, FCF/NI = 2.06
C3AccrualsPASSAccruals ratio = -3.0%. Low accruals
C4Cash vs Debt**WATCH****Cash $4.4B covers 57% of debt $7.7B**

Balance Sheet

#CheckResultDetail
D1Goodwill**FAIL****Goodwill+Intangibles $17.5B = 1,157% of equity** (distorted by buyback treasury)
D2LeveragePASSDebt/EBITDA = 2.0x. Healthy
D3Soft AssetsPASSOther assets 14.2% vs revenue 9.3%. Normal
D4ImpairmentN/ANo write-off data

Acquisition Risk

#CheckResultDetail
E1Post-Acquisition FCFPASSFCF after acquisitions positive
E2Goodwill Surge**WATCH****Goodwill+Intangibles surged 31% YoY** (RCA deal)

Beneish M-Score

#CheckResultDetail
F1M-ScorePASSM-Score = -2.54 (< -2.22). Unlikely manipulator

Additional Scores: F-Score 1.85, Z-Score 0.06 (distress zone due to thin common equity — not a substantive solvency signal for a regulated wholesaler).

Key Risks from the 10-K

1. Walgreens/Sycamore Concentration — Item 1A: "Walgreens and Boots together accounted for approximately 25% of our revenue in fiscal 2025 and, as of September 30, 2025, accounted for approximately 38% of our accounts receivable, net." The August 2025 Sycamore acquisition introduces renegotiation risk.

2. Opioid Litigation (EY Critical Audit Matter) — $3.9B accrued liability. Annual cash outflow of ~$400-500M as settlements are paid down. The 10-K discusses ongoing DOJ, DEA, state AG investigations that could produce further liability.

3. PharmaLex Track Record — Two consecutive years of goodwill impairment ($418M in 2024, $723.9M in 2025). The full writedown suggests the International Healthcare Solutions pharma services strategy is underperforming expectations.

4. RCA Integration Risk — $4.04B cash + $694M retained equity + $545.7M receivable settlement + $393.1M earn-out. Post-deal, goodwill jumped $4.4B. If the retina specialty pharmaceutical market weakens (anti-VEGF biosimilars, CMS reimbursement changes), another impairment becomes possible.

5. Cybersecurity — Item 1A: "We previously disclosed cybersecurity incidents in February 2024 and in March 2023. Although the prior incidents did not have a material adverse..." This is a company that has been breached twice in recent years and operates a system handling thousands of healthcare providers.

6. GPO and Contract Risk — "A number of our contracts with key customers or GPOs are typically subject to expiration each year, and we may lose any of these customers or GPO relationships if we are unable to extend, renew, renegotiate or replace such expired contracts." Cencora operates on many large, multi-year GPO contracts, each of which creates periodic renegotiation risk.

7. Labor/Union Exposure — "Approximately 24% of our employees are covered by collective bargaining agreements, nearly all of whom are employees located outside of the U.S." Strike risk is real in European operations.

Summary

Grade: C. The RCA acquisition is the entire story — proof point for 2026.

Cencora is a low-margin, high-volume pharmaceutical distribution business that grew revenue 9.3% to $321.3B and generated $3.9B in operating cash flow. The M-Score is a clean -2.54, cash conversion is excellent at 2.49x, and EY has audited for 40 years with a clean opinion. There is no accounting fraud signal here.

The C grade reflects three factors specific to 2025:

1.The $4.0B RCA acquisition dominated the year. Goodwill jumped 47%, long-term debt doubled, acquisition expenses hit $291M, interest expense rose 86%. The strategic logic — own the biggest drug-spending physician specialty — is sound, but this is the largest deal Cencora has done in years and the first real test of execution since PharmaLex.
2.PharmaLex was fully impaired — the second consecutive year of writedowns on a 2023 acquisition. Combined $1.14B has gone to zero, casting doubt on Cencora's international services M&A track record just as it makes the biggest bet of the year.
3.Walgreens/Sycamore concentration is a year-2026 story. With 25% of revenue from one customer now owned by a PE firm, negotiations in 2028-2029 (as contracts expire) could fundamentally reshape the business.

The opioid liability ($3.9B accrued) is known, priced in, and being paid down. EY's two CAMs both relate to this — expected for a company of Cencora's size in this industry.

The Z-Score of 0.06 and the 1,157% goodwill-to-equity ratio are mechanical artifacts of a company that has bought back more than $10B of stock over time, reducing its common equity while payables float funds the balance sheet. These metrics are not meaningful solvency signals in this specific case.

What matters for 2026: does RCA's retina specialty business deliver the growth and margin that justifies a $5.7B enterprise value? Does the Sycamore-owned Walgreens contract hold? Does the opioid liability stay on its current run-off schedule or reopen through new plaintiff discoveries?

This is a C, not a D or F, because the underlying cash engine works and the fail is a single structural ratio driven by a strategy that may or may not pay off.

**Disclaimer**: This report is based on Cencora's 2025 10-K (SEC EDGAR) and public financial data. This is NOT investment advice.

**About EarningsGrade**: We screen earnings reports for financial red flags. Grade C means the engine found some red flags that warrant deeper investigation before proceeding.

This report is based on SEC 10-K filings and public financial data. Not investment advice.

Cencora (COR) 2025 Earnings Quality Report — EarningsGrade